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Consumer Protection and the First Amendment:
A Dilemma for the FTC?
Robert B. Reich*
Truth in advertising is like leaven, which a woman hid in
three measures of meal. It provides a suitable quantity of gas
with which to blow out a mass of crude misrepresentation into
a form that the public can swallow.
-Dorothy L. Sayers,
Murder Must Advertise
Section 5(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act directs
the Commission to prevent any "unfair or deceptive act or
practice in or affecting commerce."' But neither the statute nor
its legislative history defines "unfair or deceptive," and Congress
has not clarified this extraordinarily broad legislative man-
date or furnished criteria by which to appraise the success of
the Commission's activities in this area. Nor have the courts
stepped into the breach. Perhaps out of understandable reluc-
tance to supply legislative-type standards where Congress
avoided any hint of a standard,2 or because the goal of prevent-
ing unfairness or deception has not appeared to be sharply at
odds with any other specific statutory or constitutional interest,
* Director, Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation, Federal
Trade Commission.
I wish to thank my colleagues Richard Herzog, Darius Gaskins,
Dennis Murphy, Tom Sugrue, Beverly Purdue, and Clare Dalton for
their helpful comments. The views expressed in this article are my own,
and should not be taken to represent the views of the Federal Trade
Commission or any individual Commissioner.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V 1975).
2. The legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission Act in-
dicates that Congress intended section 5(b) to serve as a flexible tool
in the hands of the FTC. Senator Thomas, in commenting on the broad
language of section 5 (b), stated:
[Ujnfair competition, like fraud, is a creature of protean shapes.
It assumes one attitude to-day and another to-morrow. As with
fraud, so will it be with unfair competition. In fraud there is
a constant race between the rogue and the chancellor. In unfair
competition there is going to be a constant race between the
corporation and the commission
51 CoNG. REc. 11,598 (1914). See also 51 CONG. REc. 11,084 (1914) (re-
marks of Senator Newlands); S. RE.'. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1914).
For a description of the activities of the FTC in applying section 5 (b)
to deceptive advertising, see Developments in the Law-Deceptive Ad-
vertising, 80 HARv. L. R.v. 1008, 1019-1101 (1967).
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courts have generally deferred to the Commission's findings of
fact and choices of remedy.3 Indeed, given the breadth of the
Commission's area of responsibility, judicial review has played
a surprisingly small role in defining the law of deception and
unfairness and demarcating the extent to which protection of
consumers must give way to competing interests.
It has therefore come as something of a rude shock for the
Commission suddenly to learn from the Supreme Court that the
first amendment protects commercial speech. Although the
Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council4 was especially solicitous of government regu-
lation aimed at preventing deception, the elevation of commercial
speech to first amendment status nevertheless suggests both a
boundary to that regulation and a standard against which it must
be measured. Lurking within the notion that the first amend-
ment guards commercial speech is the veiled suggestion, already
followed by at least one court of appeals, 5 that the courts must
scrutinize Commission action more strictly to prevent unneces-
sary interference with constitutionally protected speech.
This turn of the law and the dilemma it poses for the Com-
mission are particularly ironic in light of the Commission's recent
scrutiny of state laws restricting advertising in certain occupa-
tions. In its investigations of state advertising restrictions relat-
ing to prescription drugs,6 ophthalmic goods and services,7 the
funeral industry,8 and medical services,9 the Commission has
taken the position that such restrictions may be unfair if they
are not necessary to maintain high professional standards or to
achieve other important state goals. 10 The Commission has
3. See notes 13-33 infra and accompanying text.
4. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
5. See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 618-20 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1679 (1977); text accompanying notes 62-69
infra.
6. See Disclosure Regulations Concerning Retail Prices for Pre-
scription Drugs, Proposed Trade Regulation Rules, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,031
(1975) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 447).
7. See Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and Services, Notice of
Proceeding and Proposed Trade Regulation Rules, 41 Fed. Reg. 2399
(1976) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 456).
8. See Funeral Industry Practices, Proposed Trade Regulation
Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 39,901 (1975) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 447).
9. See American Medical Association, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,068 (1975).
10. The Commission's staff has proffered the view that such adver-
tising bans constitute an unfair trade practice because, inter alia, their
"economic and social utility to the public is substantially less than
[Vol. 61:705
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thereby invoked a variation of an old first amendment theme:
the state must fulfill its valid interests by means that impose
the least possible restriction upon speech. 1 At first blush it
would seem somewhat hypocritical, if not downright arro-
gant, for the Commission on one hand to exhort state legisla-
tures to tailor their regulation of commercial speech as narrowly
as possible, yet at the same time to guard its own prerogatives
to broadly remedy unfairness or deception.1
2
The purpose of this Article is to offer a basis for reconcil-
ing these apparent contradictions. That the Commission's deci-
sion making must now accommodate the first amendment does
not lead invariably to the conclusion that the courts should
scrutinize those decisions more carefully and limit the Commis-
sion's discretion. Nor does it suggest that the Commission should
be bound to practice what it preaches to the states and refrain
from broadly "fencing in" proven violators. Instead, in the fol-
lowing discussion I suggest that the Commission should be left
to accomplish the task that Congress gave it, and that if it does
so successfully, it will necessarily fulfill its constitutional respon-
sibilities as well.
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH UNDER THE FTC ACT
AND UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE
NEED FOR ACCOMMODATION
A. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE
The courts have long acknowledged the FTC's expertise in
discerning and remedying unfair or deceptive acts or practices.13
[their] economic and social disutility." ADVERTISING OF OPHTHALMIC
GooDs AND SERVICES, STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE CoIVussioN
AND PRoPosED TRADE REGULATION RULE 73 (January 1976).
11. See cases cited in note 70 infra.
12. See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 1679 (1977).
13. Commission investigations and inquiries may result from re-
quests of government agencies, complaints by the public, or the initiative
of the Commission itself. The Commission has delegated authority to
Assistant Directors and Regional Directors to initiate investigations. 16
C.F.R. § 2.1 (1977). When the FTC staff intends to commence a formal
investigation, they will notify the evaluation committee, which is com-
posed of attorneys and economists; the committee will attempt to assure
that the investigation is cost-effective, and that consumer injury may be
substantial. A proposed respondent may be afforded an opportunity to
have the matter disposed of by the entry of a consent order prior to com-
pletion of the investigation. Id. at §§ 2.14(a), 2.31 (a). Proposed consent
agreements or staff recommendations to bring an administrative corn-
19771
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By and large, courts have taken quite literally the scant require-
ment that Commission fact finding be "supported by evidence" 14
and have often deferred to the Commission's determination that
a certain set of facts constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or
practice.15 To find that an advertisement is deceptive, the Com-
mission need not show that there has been an actual deception,
but only that the advertisement has the capacity to deceive. 16
In measuring such capacity, the Commission interprets the adver-
tisement as the "average individual"' 7 or the "buying public" gen-
plaint are thereafter forwarded to the Commission for approval. Id. at
§ 3.11 (a). After issuance of a complaint, the matter is heard by an Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. Id. at § 3.42 (a). Upon appeal from or review
of an initial decision, the Commission will exercise all powers that it
could have exercised had it made the initial decision. Id. at § 3.54(a).
If the respondent is found in violation, the Commission will issue a cease
and desist order. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. V 1975). Within 60 days
from the issuance of the order the respondent may seek review and the
Commission may seek enforcement, of the order in a circuit court.
Id. at § 45(c) (1970). If a timely review of the order is not sought by
the respondent, the Commission's order becomes final. Id. at § 45 (g). A
respondent's violation of a final order subjects him to a civil penalty
which may be enforced by the Attorney General of the United States.
Id. at § 45 (1) (Supp. V 1975).
Pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, tit. II, 88 Stat. 2183
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (Supp. V 1975)), the Commission is
further empowered to prescribe rules that specifically define acts or
practices that are unfair or deceptive, commence civil actions to recover
civil penalties in district court against any respondent who violates such
rules, and seek redress for injuries to consumers for dishonest or fraudu-
lent acts or practices that were the subject of a cease and desist order.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
15. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965);
Resort Car Rental Sys. Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 963 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc.
v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1968); Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.
v. FTC, 352 F.2d 415, 417 (6th Cir. 1965); E.F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235
F.2d 735, 740 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957).
16. E.g., Thiret v. FTC, 512 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir. 1975) (false and
deceptive advertising of steel siding); Spiegel v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59, 63
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974) (use of "free trial" and "per-
cent off" in advertising had capacity to deceive); Regina Corp. v. FTC,
322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963) (fictitious "manufacturer's suggested re-
tail prices" had capacity to deceive); Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 595
(9th Cir. 1957) (fictitious "guild" designation had capacity to deceive);
Deer v. FTC, 152 F.2d 65, 66 (2d Cir. 1945) (use of "manufacturing" in
trade name had capacity to deceive).
17. E.g., Korber Hats, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 358, 360-62 (1st Cir.
1962) (average customer would be deceived by use of "Milan" in hat
label); Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952, 954 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1961) (average male customer would be de-
ceived by suggestion that product could cure baldness).
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erally would interpret it. 18 But since a claim that would be un-
likely to deceive an average consumer could still deceive a par-
ticularly vulnerable group, the Commission has thought it neces-
sary to appraise an advertisement's probable impact on the spe-
cific class of persons to whom it is addressed, 19 including, on occa-
sion, "the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, ' 20 or the
"least sophisticated" reader.2 1 Moreover, the representation it-
self is evaluated by reference to the general impression created by
the advertisement read as a whole with a minimal degree of
care.22 Accordingly, literal truth is no defense to a charge of de-
ceptive practices if assertions in the advertisement are so com-
18. Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956).
19. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941) (prospective automobile purchasers);
Stupel Originals, Inc. [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) fI 17,208 (1965) (children).
20. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942). See also
General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
312 U.S. 682 (1941).
21. Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961).
For example, Judge Augustus Hand's oft-quoted remark that the Com-
mission may, if it "thinks... best... insist upon a form of advertising
clear enough so that, in the words of the prophet Isaiah, 'wayfaring men,
though fools, shall not err therein,'" General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114
F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682 (1941), should be
read in the context of his observation that "[w]hile we do not regard
the plan used here as inevitably misleading, we think that in a good
many cases it would be ... ." Id. at 35. See also Bantam Books, Inc.
v. FTC, 275 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960); Charles
of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944); Aronberg
v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
This principle "loses its validity if it is applied uncritically or
pushed to an absurd extreme .... A representation does not become
false and deceptive merely because it will be unreasonably misunder-
stood by an insignificant and unrepresentative segment of the class
of persons to whom [it] is addressed." Heinz W. Kirchner [1963-1965
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) f 16,664, at 21,539-40 (1963),
aff'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964); cf. FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317
F.2d 669, 676 (2d Cir. 1963) (no violation if the "ordinary" reader, to be
misled, must have "not only a careless and imperceptive mind but also
a propensity for unbounded flights of fancy").
22. E.g., J. B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir. 1967)(advertisement implies that most tiredness results from iron deficiency
anemia); Continental Wax Corp. v. FTC, 330 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1964)("Six Month" floor wax trade name implies that wax lasts six months);
Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962) (ad-
vertisement implies that shoes have therapeutic value); Charles of the
Ritz Distribs. Corp v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944) (trade name




bined as to convey a misleading representation on a casual read-
ing.23 And the Commission may "decide for itself" whether an
advertisement creates such a misleading impression.2 4
The Commission's findings of unfairness have been similarly
treated by the courts. In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson,25 the
Supreme Court reasoned that an act need be neither a violation
of the antitrust laws nor deceptive to be "unfair" under section
5,26 and stated that the Commission should consider several fac-
tors in determining whether a practice is unfair, including:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been pre-
viously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been
established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether,
in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some com-
mon law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupu-
lous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or
competitors or other businessmen).27
Moreover, courts have held that it is no defense to a Commission
determination of unfairness that the practice was long standing
and had not previously been held unlawful under section 5, since
23. E.g., J. B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir. 1967);
Korber Hats, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 358, 360 (1st Cir. 1962); Murray Space
Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962); Koch v. FTC, 206
F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1953); Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th
Cir. 1950).
24. Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1944). See
also Bantam Books v. FTC, 275 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
819 (1960).
The Commission has discretion to weigh the validity of conflicting
evidence, and its decision will not be overturned so long as there is some
evidence in the record in support of the Commission's conclusion. See
Bakers Franchise Corp. v. FTC, 302 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1962).
25. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
26. Id. at 239-44. The Court noted that the court of appeals had
incorrectly concluded that section 5 proscribed only practices that were
contrary to the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws. While making it
clear that the Commission's authority was much broader than that, the
Court nevertheless held the cease and desist order at issue in the case
improper. The only basis in the Commission's opinion for its finding of
unfairness was antitrust violations. Since the court of appeals had
found no violation of the antitrust laws, and that judgment was not
attacked on appeal the order could not be sustained. Id. at 249-50. See
also First Buckingham Community, Inc., 73 F.T.C. 938 (1968).
27. 405 U.S. at 244-45 n.5 (quoting Statement of Basis and Purpose
of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and
Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking. 29
Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964)). See generally Pitofsky, Beyond Nader:




the public should not be allowed to suffer because of the Com-
mission's mistake, inadvertence, or lack of vigilance in the past.2 8
The Commission's authority to formulate remedies to deal
with unfair and deceptive acts and practices also has been
broadly construed. As the Supreme Court observed:
The Commission has wide discretion in its choice of a
remedy deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful practices in
this area of trade and commerce.... [Jjudicial review is
limited. It extends no further than to ascertain whether the
Commission made an allowable judgment in its choice of the
remedy .... Congress has entrusted [the Commission] with the
administration of the Act and has left the courts with only
limited powers of review. The Commission is the expert body
to determine what remedy is necessary to eliminate the unfair
or deceptive trade practices which have been disclosed. It has
wide latitude for judgment and the courts will not interfere ex-
cept where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the
unlawful practices found to exist....
The Commission is entitled not only to appraise the facts
of the particular case and the dangers of the marketing methods
employed ... but to draw from its generalized experience....
Its expert opinion is entitled to great weight in the reviewing
courts.29
Accordingly, federal courts often have sustained Commission
orders prohibiting the use of an unsubstantiated advertising
message or descriptive term30 or requiring affirmative disclosure
of certain facts, 31 without any showing that the remedy em-
28. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 80 (1934) ("There
is no bar through lapse of time to a proceeding in the public interest to
set an industry in order by removing the occasion for deception .... );
Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 181-82 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 668 (1941); Hutchinson Chem. Corp., 55 F.T.C. 1942, 1947 (1959).
Cf. NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F.2d 51, 55 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 795 (1944) (Decision by NLRB not to act on charge that com-
pany had violated National Labor Relations Act did not preclude Board
from taking action at a later date against same company based on new
complaint and different facts.).
29. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-14 (1946) (citations
omitted). See also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 394-95
(1964); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
30. See, e.g., Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 529 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 39 (1976); Beltone Elec. Corp. v. FTC, 402 F. Supp. 590
(N.D. Ill. 1975); National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488 (1973), aff'd and
remanded on other grounds, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 993 (1974); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, affd, 481
F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); Pfizer, Inc.,
81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).
31. The cases require a wide variety of affirmative disclosures.
E.g., Credit Card Serv. Corp. v. FTC, 495 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(statement on liability on lost credit cards required); Spiegel v. FTC,
494 F.2d 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974) ("subject to credit
1077]
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ployed was the only cure for the deception. Moreover, the Com-
mission has been given broad latitude to "fence in" proven viola-
tors to prevent them from engaging in other potentially unfair
or deceptive practices.3 2 The Commission "is not limited to pro-
hibiting 'the illegal practice in the precise form' existing in the
past .... [I] t may fashion its relief to restrain 'other like or
related unlawful acts.' "33
approval" required); Sunshine Art Studios, Inc. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 1171
(1st Cir. 1973) (customers have right to return nonconforming orders);
P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1970) (door-
to-door encyclopedia salespersons must disclose their purpose); All-State
Indus. v. FTC, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1970) (statement that notes would
be negotiated to third parties required); J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381
F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967) (statement required that most tiredness does not
come from iron deficiency anemia); Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295
F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961) (statement required that royalty payments are
not net returns); Bantam Books, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960) (clear and conspicuous designation
of abridgment or republication under new title required on cover of
book); L. Heller & Son, Inc. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951) (dis-
closure of foreign origin required); American Medicinal Prods., Inc. v.
FTC, 136 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1943) (harmful consequences of "Re-Duce-
oid" pills must be disclosed); Haskelite Mfg. Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d
765 (7th Cir. 1942) (disclosure of simulated materials required); Stupell
Originals, Inc., 67 F.T.C. 173 (1965) (disclosure of risk of eye injury from
toy required); cf. Beltone Elec. Corp. v. FTC, 402 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ill.
1975) (statement that hearing aids will not help many persons with hear-
ing disabilities required); Campbell Soup Co., 77 F.T.C. 664 (1970)
(consent order accepted by FTC but Commission states in dicta that it
could have required corrective advertising). But see Ward Laboratories,
Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952, 954 (2d Cir. 1960) (reviewing court states that
"affirmative disclosure of a negative is always to be approached with
caution"); Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (negative delimi-
tation improperly required by Commission).
32. In FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965), for exam-
ple, the FTC had charged Colgate with false and deceptive practices for
televising a commercial that purported to depict the moisturizing quali-
ties of a shaving cream by applying it to and shaving sandpaper; in fact,
the sandpaper was sand-covered plexiglass. The FTC issued an order
forbidding the use of any "test, experiment or demonstration that ...
is represented as actual proof of a claim . . . and . . . is not in fact a
genuine test, experiment or demonstration being conducted as repre-
sented." Id. at 382. The order applied not only to the shaving cream
but to any product the company advertised. The Court upheld the
order against a challenge that it was too broad. See also FTC v.
National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (1957); Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 529
F.2d 1398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); Resort Car Rental
Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827(1975); Luria Bros. & Co. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847, 862 (3d Cir. 1968).
33. FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 392 (1959) (citations
omitted). See also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965);
FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,
343 U.S. 470 (1952).
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Until recently the courts had limited the Commission's
remedial discretion only when the remedy proposed might un-
necessarily abridge property rights encompassed in trade names.
In FTC v. Royal Milling Co.,3 4 the Commission barred the use
of the words "milling company" since the company, though
blending and mixing flour, did not manufacture it. The Supreme
Court concluded that "less drastic means" might be adequate to
cure the deception and remanded the case to permit the Commis-
sion to consider appropriate qualifying words. Similarly, in
Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC,35 the Court reversed and remanded a
Commission order that infringed upon the use of a trade name on
the ground that the Commission had not determined whether
some less restrictive means would avoid the deception. 36 The
Court reasoned that because trade names are valuable business
assets, they should not be destroyed if less drastic means, such
as the addition of qualifying language, could accomplish the
same result. Thus, the Commission may prohibit a trade name37
only when it finds that no qualifying language can correct the
deception.
B. PROTECTED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Until recently, the first amendment was not considered a
limitation on Commission factfinding or remedial discretion be-
cause the Supreme Court deemed "purely commercial advertis-
34. 288 U.S. 212 (1933).
35. 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
36. See also Magnaflo Co. v. FTC, 343 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (full
hearing required on question whether qualifying words will clarify am-
biguity of "Lifetime Charge Battery"); Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v. FTC, 266
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959) (Commission abused its discretion in not finding
that qualifying words would cure ambiguity of cashmere content in
"Cashmora" sweaters); Bear Mill Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 98 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1938) (excision of "Manufacturing" from trade name unwarranted where
phrase "Converters, Not Manufacturers of Textiles" cures ambiguity).
37. E.g., Continental Wax Corp. v. FTC, 330 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964)
("Six Month" excised from name of floor wax); Waltham Watch Co. v.
FTC, 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1963) (excision of "Waltham" from name of
imported clocks required unless qualifying words added); Bakers Fran-
chise Corp. v. FTC, 302 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1962) ("Lite Diet" excised from
bread name); Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1958)
("Liver" excised from name of pills); Arrow Metal Prods. Corp. v. FTC,
249 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1957) ("Porcenamel" excised from name of awning
products); Gold Tone Studios, Inc. v. FTC, 183 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1950)
("Gold Tone" excised from studio name); Deer v. FTC, 152 F.2d 65 (2d
Cir. 1945) (FTC has discretion to determine whether "Manufacturing"
must be excised from trade name); Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp.
v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) ("Rejuvenescence" excised from
name of skin cream); Herzfeld v. FTC, 140 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1944)
("Mills" excised from trade name); H.N. Heusner & Son v. FTC, 106
19771
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ing" to be unprotected.38 In 1975, however, the Court announced
in Bigelow v. Virginia"9 that the constitutionality of commercial
advertising regulation was to be assessed by "weighing the First
Amendment interest against the governmental interest al-
leged. ' 40 One year later, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,41 the Court held that even
purely commercial advertising is not wholly outside the protec-
tion of the first amendment.42
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court struck down state restric-
tions on the promulgation of prescription drug'price information.
The Court made clear that not only does an advertiser or a pub-
lisher have a first amendment right to speak the truth in com-
mercial advertising, but also that the public has a right to be
informed.4 3  One of the primary values served by the first
amendment, the Court noted, is protection of the public's right
to receive the information necessary to informed decision making
in the commercial as well as the political sphere.4 4 In con-
F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1939) ("Havana" excised from domestic cigar name);
FTC v. Army & Navy Trading Co., 88 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ("Army
and Navy" excised from name of store no longer dealing substantially
in surplus goods).
38. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Compare Sci-
entific lVfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941) (FTC may not consti-
tutionally prohibit distribution of false and misleading pamphlets on
aluminum cookware by person not materially interested in cooking
utensil trade) with Steelco Stainless Steel, Inc. v. FTC, 187 F.2d 693
(7th Cir. 1951) (distributor of stainless steel cooking utensils may be
prohibited from false and deceptive advertising disparaging aluminum
cookware). See also FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d
485 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976); Regina Corp. v.
FTC, 322 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963); Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304
F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1962); E.F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957); American Medicinal Prods., Inc.
v. FTC, 136 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1943).
39. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). In Bigelow, an editor of a Virginia news-
paper appealed his conviction under a Virginia statute that prohibited
encouraging abortions through the sale or circulation of any publication.
The newspaper had published an advertisement concerning referral serv-
ices for legal abortions in New York. The Virginia supreme court af-
firmed the editor's conviction, rejecting his first amendment claim and
holding that the advertisement was commercial, and thus properly pro-
hibited under the State's police power. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the mere existence of commercial interests in the advertise-
ment did not strip the speech of first amendment protection.
40. Id. at 826.
41. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
42. Id. at 762. See also Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977);
Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977).
43. 425 U.S. at 756-57.
44. Id. at 763-64.
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cluding that commercial speech is protected, however, the
Court went to great lengths to point out that "[s] ome forms
of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible.""4 The
Court noted that the time, place, and manner of commercial
speech might be regulated, but gave no hint of the proper bounds
of such restrictions."4 The Court further observed that untruth-
ful commercial speech, like untruthful noncommercial speech,
does not deserve protection "for its own sake, '4 7 and that there
is "no obstacle to a state's dealing effectively" with deceptive
but not provably false commercial speech.48 The state may en-
sure "that the stream of commercial information flows cleanly
as well as freely. '49
Although the Court did not articulate any principles to guide
regulation of false or deceptive commercial speech, it did offer
a framework for analysis. The Court noted that commercial
speech, while enjoying first amendment protection, nevertheless
can be differentiated from noncommercial speech by virtue of its
"greater objectivity and hardiness."50  The truth of com-
mercial speech can be more easily verified, and, since advertisers
are motivated by the desire for commercial profit, such speech
is less likely to be chilled; therefore "a different degree of pro-
tection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legit-
imate commercial information is unimpaired."'1 Important state
interests, such as avoidance of falsity or deception, may -justify
greater restrictions on commercial speech, not because it is any
less valuable than noncommercial speech, but because it is less
vulnerable. It follows that any regulation designed to prohibit
falsity or deception is legitimate so long as it does not impair the
flow of truthful commercial information.
While the first amendment does not protect untruthful
commercial speech "for its own sake," it presumably affords some
of the same protections accorded untruthful noncommercial
speech. The only difference is one of degree, not of principle.
As the Court recognized in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,52 al-
though an "erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitu-
45. Id. at 770.
46. Id. at 771.
47. Id. (citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 772.
50. Id. at 771 n.24.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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tional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate."5 3
Therefore, "punishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cau-
tious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms of speech and press. ' 'M Although this risk is not as sub-
stantial in the commercial context, it nevertheless exists. The
threat of a cease and desist order conceivably could deter an ad-
vertiser from investing in the development and communication
of a truthful claim that might not survive FTC scrutiny. There-
fore, although the government arguably may go further toward
preventing false commercial speech than false noncommercial
speech, its discretion to eliminate falsity is bounded by the prin-
ciple that truthful speech not be deterred.
Regulation of statements that are not provably false but are
nevertheless deceptive or misleading would seem similarly per-
missible to ensure that the stream of commercial information
flows "cleanly. 55 But because a portion of such statements will
in fact be truthful, the deterrent principle that limits the permis-
sible regulation of false statements is insufficient to assure un-
impaired communication of truthful statements. To guarantee
that truthful commercial information flows "freely" as well as
cleanly, the regulation of deceptive, but not necessarily false,
commercial speech presumably would be subject to the additional
requirement that it pose the least possible hindrance to the flow
of potentially truthful information. If a statement were decep-
tive only because of the context in which it appeared and if qual-
ifying language could cure the deception, prohibiting the state-
ment itself would appear unjustifiable. Similarly, were the de-
ception attributable to inferences likely to be drawn from literally
truthful information and if a slight change in phraseology could
eliminate the deceptive inference, there would be no basis for pro-
hibiting the message. As the Court noted in Virginia Pharmacy,
it may be permissible only "to require that a commercial message
appear in such a form, or include such additional information,
warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being
deceptive."56
Finally, Virginia Pharmacy strongly suggests that barring
truthful commercial speech simply because it might cause con-
sumers to act against their best interests is not justified. Accord-
53. Id. at 340.
54. Id.
55. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
56. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (emphasis added).
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ing to the Court, the free flow of commercial information is "in-
dispensible to the proper allocation of resources in the free enter-
prise system,"57 and the government is ill-equipped properly to
allocate those resources based on its own view of the consumers'
best interests. Thus, for the Court, the marketplace of ideas has
a firm analogue in the commercial marketplace, 58 and the liberal
democratic notion of the relationship of free speech to the
achievement of optimal political choices has its analogue in the
relationship of commercial speech to allocative efficiency.5 9 If
one premise underlying the first amendment interest in noncom-
mercial speech is that citizens should be able to make their own
political choices even if such choices are haimful or unwise, a
corollary premise is that the government should not make com-
mercial choices for consumers. The Court explicitly discussed
this premise in Virginia Pharmacy:
It appears to be feared that if the pharmacist who wishes
to provide low cost, and assertedly low quality, services is per-
mitted to advertise, he will be taken up on his offer by too many
unwitting customers. They will choose the low-cost, low-quality
service and drive the "professional" pharmacist out of business.
They will respond only to costly and excessive advertising, and
end up paying the price. They will go from one pharmacist to
another, following the discount, and destroy the pharmacist-
customer relationship. They will lose respect for the profession
because it advertises. All this is not in their best interests, and
all this can be avoided if they are not permitted to know who
is charging what.
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information
is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication
rather than to close them. If they are truly open, nothing pre-
vents the "professional" 'pharmacist from marketing his own
assertedly superior product, and contrasting it with that of the
low-cost, high-volume prescription drug retailer. But the choice
among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the
Virginia General Assembly's. It is precisely this kind of choice,
between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers
of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment
makes for us.6 0
Viewed in this light, the first amendment protects consum-
ers' opportunities to choose for themselves the price they are
57. Id. at 765 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 760 (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825-26
(1975)).
59. Id. at 765. See A. ME=EJOHN, Fas SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964), and cases cited therein.
60. 425 U.S. at 769-70 (emphasis added).
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willing to pay for differing degrees of quality, service, or even
safety. A free flow of commercial information will tend to alert
consumers to available options; if there is a demand for different
degrees of quality, service, or safety at corresponding prices, the
market will be segmented according to this demand, and vendors
will have an incentive to supply truthful information about their
particular products in comparison to other products. As a result,
consumers will easily find products that adequately fulfill their
needs and desires. The "danger" in suppressing information is
that some consumers might be forced to purchase more quality,
service, or safety than they would choose to pay for if fully in-
formed of their options.6 1
Taken together, these principles appear to delineate the
bounds of permissible commercial speech regulation and to sug-
gest that the FTC's authority to prevent "unfair or deceptive"
advertising must accommodate the first amendment. But they
do not necessarily suggest that the Commission can no longer
shape remedial relief to "fence in" violators and proscribe decep-
tion and unfairness in all its various forms. That limitation
would be appropriate only if the first amendment goal of protect-
ing commercial speech were at odds with the goal of protecting
consumers from unfairness or deception, so that pursuit of one
might entail a sacrifice of the other. But if the two interests
are entirely consistent, so that protection of the free flow of
truthful commercial speech follows necessarily from the pursuit
of consumer protection, there is no reason to narrow the scope
of the Commission's authority.
This distinction between the need to accommodate the first
amendment and to restrict the Commission's authority appar-
ently has been lost on at least one court of appeals. In Beneficial
Corp. v. FTC,62 the Commission filed a complaint charging the
company with unfair and deceptive trade practices in connection
with preparing income tax returns and making consumer loans
in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act. Beneficial, which
61. The Court in Bigelow also expressed distaste for government
paternalism observing that "Virginia is really asserting an interest in
regulating what Virginians may hear or read about [lawful] New York
services." 421 U.S. at 827. The Court suggested that the state could
have availed itself of a less restrictive alternative by disseminating in-
formation to enable women in Virginia who were considering a New
York abortion "to make better informed decisions when they leave."
Id. at 824. But see Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
582 (D.D.C. 1971), alf'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
62. 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1679 (1977).
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specialized in making personal loans based on credit worthiness,
had entered the tax return preparation business in the belief that
customers who needed funds to pay taxes would find it conven-
ient to borrow from Beneficial. When Beneficial found that most
tax service customers would actually receive tax refunds, the
company decided to advertise an "instant tax refund." The tax
refund loan, however, was simply Beneficial's normal loan ser-
vice based on the credit worthiness of the borrower. After an
evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge found that
Beneficial had violated section 5. On administrative appeal, the
Commission concluded:
The early Instant Tax Refund advertising is, on its face,
totally misleading about the true nature of Beneficial's offer.
Instead of making clear that Beneficial is simply offering its
everyday loan service, the advertising implies that Beneficial
will give a special cash advance to income tax preparation cus-
tomers with a government refund due, in the amount of their
refund. The natural impression, since the Instant Tax Refund
is stressed as exclusive and special is that this cash advance is
different from a normal consumer loan.6 3
Both the administrative law judge and the Commission
concluded that only a total ban on the use of the phrase "instant
tax refund" or any words of similar import could remedy the
violation. The Commission reasoned:
In fact, since its inception .. . the Instant Tax Refund phrase
has deceived continuously, and Beneficial's repeated efforts to
explain it have not cured the false impression it leaves.. . . No
brief language is equal to the task of explaining the Instant Tax
Refund slogan, for the phrase is inherently contradictory to the
truth of Beneficial's offer. In truth, the Instant Tax Refund is
not a refund at all, but only Beneficial's every day loan service
... ; nor is it in the least related to any tax refunds, for the
size of the loan Beneficial wishes to sell is geared to the cus-
tomer's credit limit instead of his government refund and many
people due a government refund do not qualify for an Instant
Tax Refund loan at all .... 64
Accordingly, the Commission ordered Beneficial to cease and
desist from using the term "instant tax refund" in advertising
its consumer loan business.
On appeal before the Third Circuit, Beneficial contended that
explanatory words could have cured any tendency to mislead,
and that forcing it to abandon entirely its copyrighted and
heavily promoted phrase was unwarranted. The court agreed.
Acknowledging that it ordinarily was obliged to defer to the
63. Id. at 617.
64. Id. at 622.
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Commission's exercise of discretion in framing remedial orders,
the court nevertheless noted that it was "dealing in this case
with the government regulation of a form of speech. The first
amendnent requires, we believe, an examination of the Commis-
sion's action that is more searching than in other contexts."6 5
Relying on Virginia Pharmacy, the court concluded that "the
remedy for the perceived violation can go no further in impos-
ing a prior restraint on protected commercial speech than is
reasonably necessary to accomplish the remedial objective of pre-
venting the violation." 60 The court rejected the Commission's
determination that no qualifying language could adequately dis-
pel the deception inherent in Beneficial's use of the phrase
"instant tax refund" and suggested two examples that would pre-
serve intact the "instant tax refund" phrase.6 7 The court con-
cluded that the Commission had "exceeded its remedial author-
ity" because it failed "to consider fully the feasibility of requir-
ing merely that advertising copy be rewritten in lieu of total
excision of the offending language."6 8 Accordingly, the "instant
tax refund" portion of the order was vacated. 69
The court of appeals assumed without discussion that be-
cause the free flow of truthful commercial speech is protected
by the first amendment, the Commission's discretion to frame
remedial relief must be narrowed accordingly. And it follows
quite naturally from this assumption that the court must use
its independent judgment to assure that the Commission used
the least restrictive means of preventing deception.7 0  The logic
of this approach is unassailable, once the initial assumption is
accepted. In fact, the federal government itself used similar
65. Id. at 618-19.
66. Id. at 619.
67. For the text of the two examples suggested by the Third Circuit
and a criticism thereof, see text accompanying note 118 infra.
68. 542 F.2d at 619.
69. Id. at 621.
70. Cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967) ("[w]hen
legitimate legislative concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes
a substantial burden on protected First Amendment activities, Congress
must achieve its goal by means which have a 'less drastic' impact on
the continued vitality of First Amendment freedoms."); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (state statute held invalid; Court stated
that "this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose
be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved."); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943) (city ordinance held to violate the first amendment). See also
text accompanying note 11 supra.
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reasoning in a recent first amendment challenge to a state ban
on attorney advertising. In response to the state's argument that
such advertising is inherently misleading because the quality of
legal services may be impossible to measure and the amount of
work involved may vary enormously from case to case, the gov-
ernment noted that the state's restriction was overly broad;
rather than ban all such advertising, the state needed only to
ban comparative claims that one lawyer was better or less expen-
sive than another.71 Indeed, if it is assumed that the first amend-
ment requires a narrowing of administrative discretion, there is
no apparent reason why administrative factfinding that bears
upon first amendment rights should be any more immune from
judicial scrutiny than is the choice of remedy. 72 Accordingly, it
would not be unreasonable for a reviewing court to judge inde-
pendently what constitutes deception or unfairness.
The distinction between the Commission's responsibility to
accommodate the first amendment in its consumer protection
71. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, In re
Bates, 555 P.2d 640 (Ariz. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Bates v. State Bar, 97
S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
72. The appropriate scope of review of administrative factfind-
ing that implicates constitutional rights has undergone a gradual evolu-
tion since the Court in Ohio Valley Water v. Ben Avon Borough, 253
U.S. 287 (1920), held that due process required states to provide an
opportunity to submit questions of confiscation to a judicial tribunal "for
determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and
facts." Id. at 289. See also St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U.S. 38 (1936); Spring Valley Water Co. v. San Francisco, 165 F.
667 (N.D. Cal. 1908). But notwithstanding the gradual demise of Ben
Avon, see, e.g., K. DAVIS, AxnvmsTmATnm LAW TExT § 29.08, at 541 (3d
ed. 1972), the preferred status of first amendment rights has led courts
to adopt a broader scope for reviewing restrictions on them than on
property rights. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298
U.S. 38, 77 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). In Grove Press, Inc. v.
Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affd, 276 F.2d 433 (2d
Cir. 1960), for example, the district court granted a declaratory judgment
and injunction reversing the order of the Postmaster General that Lady
Chatterley's Lover was obscene and thus nonmailable. The district court
held that the book was not obscene within the statute making obscene
articles nonmailable and ruled that the issue of obscenity was fully re-
viewable. Id. at 494, 502. The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that the
determination whether a. work of art is obscene has little to do with con-
siderations of administrative expertise, and "the constitutional overtones
implicit in the issue" indicated that the scope of review should be very
broad." Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433, 435-36 (2d Cir.
1960). The court of appeals observed that full review is required when
first amendment rights are involved; "[e]ven factual matters must be
reviewed on appeal against a claim of denial of a constitutional right."
Id. at 436 (citations omitted). See also Huntley v. Public Util. Comm'n,
69 Cal. 2d 67, 71, 442 P.2d 685, 687, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605, 607 (1968).
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activities, suggested by Virginia Pharmacy, and the need for the
courts to narrow the Commission's discretion, suggested by Bene-
ficial Finance, is therefore critical. In the remainder of this
Article, I intend to provide both a basis for drawing this distinc-
tion and a framework for accommodating the Commission's
statutory responsibility under section 5 with its constitutional
responsibility under the first amendment.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOMMODATION
If there is a single characteristic that differentiates commer-
cial speech from noncommercial speech, it is that commercial
speech is a commodity in trade, whose price, availability, and
quality will depend to a large extent on consumer demand.73
Sellers engage in commercial speech to propose a transaction that
generates net revenues. If consumers do not want or need the
information, they will be unwilling to pay for it and will pur-
chase lower priced products from competing sellers who do not
advertise, or who advertise less.
Because of this peculiarity of commercial speech, its "free
flow" at any given time will be "impaired" to the extent that
consumers underestimate their need for commercial information,
and thereby underinvest in it. Government intervention to pro-
tect consumers from unfairness or deception can-and should-
enhance the free flow of commercial information rather than en-
cumber it, by enabling consumers to invest more fully in it. Ac-
73. This characterization of commercial speech is, of course, by no
means definitive or exhaustive. In recent years several courts and com-
mentators have struggled to define commercial speech precisely so as
to distinguish it from noncommercial speech. For a summary of these
efforts, see Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Ad-
vertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 205
(1976). The virtue of characterizing commercial speech as a commodity
is that such a characterization focuses on the necessary relationship be-
tween its supply and demand. Those who engage in noncommercial
speech do not care about generating net revenues from their endeavor,
but those who offer commercial information do so with the expectation
that their investment will yield a profit. This holds true whether the
supply of commercial information is responsive to demand or helps to
create it. Even if it is assumed that advertising creates consumer de-
mand for the product being advertised, see, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, THE Ar-
FLUENT SOCIETY 149 (2d ed. 1969); J. GALBRATH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL
STATE 272-73 (1967), advertisers will invest in the provision of commer-
cial information only to the extent that they can profit from their invest-
ment. Their ability to manufacture demand will be limited; the point
at which marginal demand begins to fall below the marginal cost of pro-
viding information will mark the extent of their investment,
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cordingly, the goals of protecting consumers and protecting the
first amendment rights of sellers who engage in commercial
speech are entirely compatible, as the following discussion makes
clear.
A. COMvMERCIAL INFORMATION AS A COMMODITY IN TRADE
Consumers bear several related costs when they purchase
goods or services, the most visible of which is the purchase price.
Other costs are often hidden: the product may cause bodily in-
jury or impair health (even a relatively inexpensive Hungarian
goulash can become substantially more expensive with the con-
sumer's every subsequent visit to the doctor complaining of gas-
tric upset); use of the product may cause property damage (a
new waterbed causes a ceiling to collapse); the product may re-
quire expensive or time-consuming maintenance and servicing
(spare parts must be specially ordered from Albania); the prod-
uct may require enormous amounts of fuel; it may need to be
totally replaced in a relatively short time (what looked like cast
iron proves in fact to be reinforced cardboard); it may be inade-
quate to perform the tasks that the consumer had in mind, requir-
ing her to forego those tasks or spend more to do them; or, to
reverse the coin, the product may be more than adequate, capable
of doing far more than the consumer needed, which indicates that
the consumer paid an unnecessarily high price for it.
Rational consumers will wish to minimize the product's pur-
chase price74 plus any hidden costs, while receiving a product
that fulfills their needs. But to accomplish this feat, they must
bear still other costs. First, consumers must define their needs.
Diagnostic information, which identifies and measures such par-
ticular requirements, can be expensive. For example, to avoid
the potential effects of Hungarian goulash, the consumer may
have to undergo a battery of tests to determine what kind of
foods his peculiar stomach can abide; similarly, to avoid having
a waterbed crash through the ceiling, he may have to employ
a structural engineer to measure the tolerance of his upstairs
floor. Second, after discovering their particular needs, con-
sumers must learn the capabilities of different products to fulfill
those needs. Product testing information, revealing, for ex-
ample, the contents of a particular Hungarian goulash or the
fully-inflated weight of a particular water bed, also can be costly.
74. For the purposes of the following discussion, "purchase price"
comprises the seller's cost and profit, including the cost of advertising.
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Third, for the diagnostic and product testing information to be
useful, consumers must have access to it. Communication, in
the form of product advertising and consumer searching, itself
is costly.7 5
To be sure, the combined cost of diagnosis, product testing,
and communication conceivably could exceed the total cost of
the "best" product. But it would be nonsensical for consumers
to expend more resources trying to locate a product than the
potential savings available from finding it. For example, if a
consumer has discovered three adequate lawnmowers of equal
price, the best of which would save him $1 in convenience
and quality, there is no reason to spend more than $1 to discover
which of the three is truly the best. Accordingly, rational con-
sumers will purchase product information only to the point
where the marginal cost of obtaining that additional information
is likely to exceed any marginal gain in the total value of
the product- In short, rational consumers will set out to
minimize the total cost of finding the product plus the total cost
of the product itself (including all hidden costs). 76 Thus, the
"best" purchasing decision is not "best" in absolute terms, but
only relative to the cost of the diagnosis, testing, and communi-
cation necessary to make it. That some consumers may accept
high total product costs, in the form of risky, inadequate, or high
energy-consuming products, does not necessarily indicate that the
market is not functioning efficiently, for such a choice may re-
flect a rational trade-off against even higher information costs.
It follows that a less costly range of products (including
potential hidden costs) will require less costly attempts to ensure
that the purchasing decision is a good one. If the price of the
product is low, and the adverse consequences of a bad choice are
minimal, self-diagnosis may be completely adequate ("I know
75. A slightly different typology has been used by Nelson, who
distinguishes between "search qualities"-qualities of a brand that the
consumer can determine prior to purchase-and "experience qualities"-
qualities that the consumer cannot determine prior to purchase. See
Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. EcoN. 729 (1974); Nelson,
Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970). Darby
and Korni use the term "credence qualities" to describe qualities that
cannot be evaluated through normal use of a product, but can only be
assessed by gaining additional costly information. See Darby & Korni,
Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J. LAW. & EcoN.
67 (1973).




what kind of food agrees with me"); as will self-searching ("let's
see if there's a restaurant in the neighborhood"); and self-testing
("it looks like a dive, but I'll try it once"). Alternatively, con-
sumers might rely on the judgment of trusted friends, who are
aware of their particular needs ("you'll love the ambiance, but
don't eat the goulash"). If the product thereafter proves worthy,
the cost of diagnosing, testing, and locating it in the future can
be greatly reduced by merely repurchasing it. Indeed, the busi-
ness value of "goodwill" derived from an established trade name
or marketing technique is that consumers are willing to pay a
premium for what they save by avoiding costly diagnosing, test-
ing, and searching for the product (although the internal cost
to the business of assuring uniform and consistent quality will
increase accordingly). 7
Occasionally, of course, it is more reasonable to look else-
where for reliable information. Where an incorrect purchasing
decision could pose high risks to health or property, or could
result in substantial economic loss (high purchase price or other
"once in a lifetime" qualities), self-diagnosis or self-testing is un-
wise. Prudence would dictate, for example, seeking out expert
advice about the need for maintenance or repair of complex
machinery (be it automobile, home plumbing, or one's own
body). Similarly, it would seem advisable to refrain from in-
gesting unidentified pills or investing a small fortune in an
untested machine "just to see if it works" and to rely instead
on tests performed by others. Indeed, it is often necessary for
sellers to offer new products at a discount or to guarantee "com-
plete satisfaction or your money back" in order to offset con-
sumers' understandable reluctance to sail such uncharted seas.
By the same token, if the sources of diagnostic or product test-
ing information are scattered, but the group of consumers who
want the information are identifiable and can be reached through
some common medium, it may be more efficient for the sources to
communicate their information than for the consumers to spend
their own time and resources trying to locate the sources. For
example, a shipper specializing in Caribbean cruises could locate
prospective purchasers by advertising in the New Yorker far
more efficiently than prospective purchasers could locate the par-
ticular shipper by writing to shipping companies.
77. See Cunningham, Perceived Risk and Brand Loyalty, in RisK




Some sources of diagnostic and testing information sell
nothing but such information, in which case the consumer pays
primarily for reliability and good judgment. Consumer guides,
independent testing laboratories, newspaper reviewers, and vari-
ous types of appraisers fit within this category, as do-on a
slightly more general level-training manuals, adult education
courses, and how-to-do-it books. Because property rights in such
information are limited, however, and difficult to enforce against
a recipient who is apt to share the information freely with
others,78 the direct cost of developing and communicating diag-
nostic and testing information is likely to be borne by parties who
also have a pecuniary interest in the products under scrutiny.
Some of these parties in effect function as agents and select the
products on behalf of consumers; in exchange, they charge con-
sumers a premium for the quality of their selection. Travel
agents, stock brokers, realtors, and fancy department stores all
bear much of the direct cost of diagnosing, testing, and commu-
nicating and then pass these costs on to consumers who find it
more efficient to rely upon such intermediaries than to carry on
their own diagnosis, test, and search. Alternatively, reliable in-
formation about product risks or inadequacies can sometimes be
derived from competitors, for whom the cost of developing such
information may be less than the expected revenues generated in
sales of their own product-assuming, of course, that the com-
petitor's own product does not share similar defects.79
Of course, sellers often can generate test information about
their products more efficiently than any other source because
they have direct access to and control over the products. They
can run tests at a routine step in the production or marketing
process and are aware of the particular product characteristics
that require most careful attention. Similarly, sellers of mainte-
nance or repair services often can generate diagnostic informa-
tion more efficiently than other sources because they can both
diagnose and respond to a particular need in a single transaction.
Rational consumers are likely to select the source of infor-
mation that is both least expensive and most reliable, relative
78. See R. POsNER, REGULATION Or ADVERTISING BY =HE F.T.C. 3
(1973).
79. In oligopolistic markets, sellers may want to avoid disclosing
the advantages of their products and the disadvantages of competitors'
products for fear of triggering competition, or creating opportunities for
entry or expansion of sales by new entrants. See Pitofsky, Beyond
Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HAav.
L. REv. 661, 664-66 (1977).
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to the total product cost at stake. The sources of such informa-
tion likewise can be expected to bear the direct cost of producing
it only insofar as consumer demand produces adequate revenues.
In this way, the information market should generate approxi-
mately the "right" amount of reliable information to enable con-
sumers to make adequately informed purchasing decisions.
Problems arise, however, because even rational consumers
may underestimate the risk of economic loss or personal injury
attendant upon their purchasing decision, or may overestimate
the reliability of diagnosis or product testing information. If the
information is sold in conjunction with the product, the seller
has no incentive to inform the consumer accurately of the con-
sumer's need for the product, or of the product's hidden defects.
Alternatively, the consumer may overestimate the proportion of
the purchase price actually attributable to diagnoses or tests; the
consumer may have preferred to purchase a more reliable diag-
nosis or test than the one actually received and to purchase
a correspondingly less elaborate product. (Indeed, many con-
sumer complaints about unnecessary work performed by auto
mechanics or doctors may be attributable to this type of misesti-
mation.) In either case, as a result of such misestimations,
consumers may discover-too late-that they expended too little
for information relative to the potential savings of a better pur-
chasing decision.
Misestimations of reliability of information or risk of loss
could be reduced, of course, if consumers or sellers, or both, were
required to exercise more care in their transactions; but how
much care, and who should exercise it are complex issues. The
ultimate question is not whether caveat emptor or caveat vendi-
tor is the correct principle, but under what circumstances and
to what extent one principle is to be preferred to the other.
If consumers and sellers could bargain with each other over the
allocation of this responsibility, free from the cumbersome costs
of transacting those bargains, presumably they would automati-
cally allocate the responsibility to the party in the best position
to minimize the likelihood of misestimations.8 0 In the real world
of unequal bargaining power and lack of coordination among con-
sumers, however, liability rules may be necessary to help achieve
this result. Indeed, common law causes of action sounding in
80. See generally Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation
and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J. LAW & EcoN. 67 (1968); Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1960).
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contract or tort in effect require the seller to bear the cost of
assuring that his product is fit for ordinary use and not unreason-
ably dangerous, since "ordinary use" and "unreasonable danger"
signal instances where consumers are likely to have well-estab-
lished expectations that can be dispelled only if the seller warns
that the product is being sold "as is" or presents. unusual risks.
But in other circumstances the administrative cost of private liti-
gation to ascertain whether consumers or sellers could most
reasonably take precautions necessary to avoid misestimation is
likely to be prohibitive.81 More direct forms of government
regulation therefore may be appropriate.
Viewed in this light, the purpose of FTC regulation of
commercial speech is not to avoid unfairness or deception at all
cost, but rather to allocate the responsibility for avoiding mis-
estimations of risk and reliability to the seller8 2 when the seller
is likely to be better able than the consumer to minimize them.
The principles that should guide this allocation derive from
hypotheses about the allocation that consumers and sellers would
achieve from free bargaining, were such bargaining possible.
1. Assuring the Reliability of Representations
Sellers should not be required to test the reliability of their
representations if it is more efficient for consumers to obtain
equally or more reliable product testing information on their
own. For example, there is no reason to require sellers to test
relatively inexpensive products to assure the accuracy or truth-
fulness of product claims which consumers are likely to test
themselves before making definite decisions about future pur-
81. See G. CALABRESI, THM COST or AccIDENTs; A LEGAL Am Eco-
NoMIc ANALYsIs 250-54 (1970).
82. For simplicity's sake, the following discussion focuses on in-
stances in which the seller is likely to be in the best position to minimize
the cost of misestimations and the cost of avoiding misestimations. But
sometimes third party "information brokers" may be best situated-when
the cost to them of discovering defects in sellers' products is likely to
be less than the cost to the sellers individually. The Commission's recent
holder-in-due-course rule, preserving consumers' claims and defenses
against third party financiers, responds to such a situation. See 16 C.F.R.
§ 433 (1977). Pursuant to the rule, financiers-who are best situated
to "police" the market and guard against defective products marketed
by sellers who border on insolvency-must in effect bear the direct cost
of discovery; such costs presumably are passed on to consumers in the
form of more costly credit. But consumers come out ahead because the
direct cost to them of guarding against defective products and insolvent
sellers would be much greater.
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chases. Consumers are likely to discount a claim that a certain
candy bar "tastes yummy" or will "melt in your mouth" because
the literal truthfulness of the claim is not particularly important
to the purchasing decision; indeed, most consumers probably in-
terpret such statements as mere invitations to try the product,
rather than as product testing information. In contrast, it
may be appropriate to require sellers rigorously to test the
accuracy of performance claims made about expensive products
(in terms of total costs) that are rarely repurchased and about
which little can be learned upon inspection, such as an automo-
bile or a vacation in the Orient. In these instances, it is more
efficient for sellers to assure the reliability of their claims
and for consumers to depend on that assurance than for con-
sumers to look elsewhere for the information. Were it not for
the high cost of bargaining over the reliability of this informa-
tion, consumers would probably rather pay sellers to assure its
reliability than purchase "reliability insurance" 83 at a higher cost
from another party, or go without any insurance and either not
rely on the information at all or rely on it and bear the high
risk (and cost) of overestimating its reliability. Between these
two extremes lies a continuum of circumstances in which it
would be most efficient for consumers to some extent to rely
on the accuracy of sellers' claims, and in which sellers should to
a corresponding extent undertake product testing to support
their claims.
Although it is not the purpose of this Article to examine
the extent to which the FTC in practice has adhered to this prin-
ciple, it is worth noting that the legal theory supporting the Com-
mission's advertising substantiation program is entirely consist-
ent with it. In Pfizer, Inc.,8 4 the Commission held that it is an
unfair trade practice to make affirmative product claims without
having a "reasonable basis" for such claims.85 Although the com-
plaint against Pfizer, charging unfair and deceptive advertising
of the anesthetic properties of an ointment, was dismissed
because the evidence on the record was inconclusive, 6 the
83. Such insurance, if actually available, would protect purchasers
against losses caused by their reliance on a seller's claims if the claims
proved untruthful. The FTC might be seen as a sort of reliability in-
surer; although it does not reimburse for losses, it does attempt to prevent
losses by assuring the reliability of sellers' claims.
84. 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).
85. Id. at 62.
86. Id. at 73.
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Commission indicated that, in determining whether the vendor
had a "reasonable basis" for making his claim, it would look to
various factors, including the possible consequences of a false
claim, the degree of consumer reliance on the claim, and whether
a reasonably prudent advertiser should have discovered the facts
before making the claim.8 7 Accordingly, the Commission rea-
soned that substantiation is most necessary where:
[Tihe complexity of a consumer product, and accordingly the
large amount of detailed product information necessary to an in-
formed decision, makes the costs of obtaining product informa-
tion prohibitive .... [WIith the development and proliferation
of highly complex and technical products, there is often no
practical way for consumers to ascertain the truthfulness of af-
firmative product claims prior to buying and using the product.
Given the imbalance of knowledge and resources between
a business enterprise and each of its customers, economically it
is more rational, and imposes far less cost on society, to require
a manufacturer to confirm his affirmative product claims rather
than to impose a burden upon each individual consumer to test,
investigate, or experiment for himself.88
Similarly, the Commission has held that "substantial scientific
test data" is required to support a claim that "involves a matter
of human safety. . . which consumers themselves cannot verify
since they have neither the equipment nor the knowledge to
undertake the complicated . . . tests required [and therefore]
must rely on the technical expertise of the manufacturer to
assure the validity of its claims."8 9 Where consumers have less
reason to depend upon seller's representations, however, a less
87. Id. at 64.
88. Id. at 61-64. The Commission in Pfizer offered the following
comparison:
Compare Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
Harv. L. Rev. 537, 542 (1972).
"Reasonableness is determined by a straightforward balancing
of costs and benefits. If the risk yields a net social utility(benefit), the victim is not entitled to recover from the risk-
creator; if the risk yields a net social disutility (cost), the vic-
tim is entitled to recover. The premises of this paradigm are
that reasonableness provides a test of activities that ought to
be encouraged and that tort judgments are an appropriate me-
dium for encouraging them."
This balance admittedly gives more consideration to the pro-
ducers' interests than does the test suggested by Adam Smith:
"[Tihe interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so
far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer."
Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations, 625 (Modern Library Edition, 1937).
Id. at 62 n.13.
89. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 451 (1972), aff'd,
481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
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rigorous standard of substantiation has been required.0 And
where consumers have no reason to rely on claims, or no reason
to construe representations as conveying product testing informa-
tion, the Commission has deemed such claims mere "puffing"
that need not be substantiated.9 1
2. Disclosing Potential Loss
Consumers may underestimate the potential loss associated
with various purchasing decisions, particularly if they are un-
aware of health or property risks entailed in using the product,
or if the sellers' claims lead consumers to believe that such risks
are lower than they are in fact. But the responsibility for avoid-
ing underestimations should be allocated to sellers only in instan-
ces where sellers can most efficiently provide information about
the risks.
The seller of a waterbed, for example, is probably in the best
position to disclose its fully inflated weight and to warn con-
sumers that because the fully inflated bed may endanger the
floor upon which it is placed, they should be particularly careful
to check the soundness of their floor before they buy. But there
is no apparent reason for the seller of a normal bed to disclose
its weight. A potential purchaser who lives in an unusually
brittle house should bear the responsibility of knowing that bed
weight is a factor to be considered in making his purchasing deci-
sion and of inquiring about the weight of particular beds. To
take another example, because of economies of scale and access,
drug manufacturers are better situated than consumers to bear
the direct costs of testing for the risks new drugs might pose
to persons with any one of a variety of common ailments and
disabilities, and of communicating the results of such testing by
warnings on drug labels. But in determining the risks new drugs
would pose to persons with very rare ailments, it is prob-
ably more efficient for hospitals or independent testing labora-
tories to engage in testing and communication at the specific re-
90. See, e.g., National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 552-53 (1973),
affd and remanded on other grounds, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974).
91. H.W. Kirchner Co., 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290, 1293 (1963). A cig-
arette manufacturer's claim that its product was "less irritating" was
held to be capable of objective measurement, Liggett & Meyers Tobacco
Co., 55 F.T.C. 354, 375 (1958), while a claim that a toothpaste will "beau-
tify the smile" has been found to be within the "puffing" defense, Bristol-




quest of those who suffer such ailments, since those individuals
are far more likely than manufacturers to know that prior test-
ing is necessary 2  Similarly, the direct cost of diagnosis to
ascertain whether a potential drug user has any of the conditions
listed on the drug label is probably more efficiently borne by
prospective users than by manufacturers or sellers. In all cases,
were it not for high transaction costs, appropriate allocations of
responsibility would naturally occur because consumers would
prefer to purchase this information from the cheapest reliable
source whenever they thought the purchase was preferable to
remaining uninformed and thus bearing the cost of underesti-
mating potential loss.
Once again, the legal framework supporting the Commis-
sion's affirmative disclosure program is consistent with this
analysis. The Commission may order affirmative disclosure if
it finds that failure to disclose is misleading because of unex-
pected material consequences resulting from use of the product
or because other statements in the advertisement create false
expectations.9 3  For example, in complaints challenging alleged
fraudulent land sales schemes, the Commission has charged sep-
arate violations for failure to disclose specific details about future
land development programs, and failure to disclose that the pur-
chase price of lots was not all-inclusive (for example, that paved
roads and sewer systems were not available, and telephone serv-
ice and electricity were available only at unreasonable prices).94
92. Sellers or manufacturers are better able than individual con-
sumers to spread the cost of diagnosing or testing over all consumer
transactions. It might therefore seem fairer, although less efficient, if
drug manufacturers bore the direct cost of diagnosing or testing even for
rare ailments than if the sufferer commissioned his own diagnosis or
test. In effect, this allocation of cost would entail a wealth transfer
from ordinary drug users to potential users with the rare ailment. If
such potential users deserve subsidization, however, it would be less
costly to subsidize individual diagnoses or tests directly from public
funds (or from special taxes upon the sale of drugs) than to require
manufacturers to test the effect of a new drug on all such persons, some
of whom would never use it.
93. See J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 387 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir. 1967).
94. See, e.g., Horizon Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TsDaE REG.
REP. (CCH) 20,845 (1975); AmRep Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder]
TADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20, 846 (1975). See also J.B. Williams Co. v.
FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967) (involving failure to disclose, in con-
nection with advertisements of the iron tonic Geritol, that most fatigue
has nothing to do with iron deficiency anemia); Keele Hair & Scalp Spe-
cialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960) (involving failure to dis-




Similarly, in a number of cases, the Commission challenged vo-
cational school advertising on the ground that failure to disclose
the percentage of enrollees who do not complete the course and
do not obtain employment on graduation is unfair and decep-
tive.95
3. Excising Truthful Information Only as a Last Resort
The third principle follows as a corollary to the first two.
Once it is determined that sellers are better able than consumers
(or third parties) to minimize the direct cost of avoiding misesti-
mations, it follows that the sellers should use the least costly
means of achieving that end-whether it be by assuring the
truthfulness of claims through product testing, by disclosing ad-
ditional information, or by eliminating certain truthful claims al-
together. The last option is likely to be the most costly to
consumers, since elimination of any truthful claim may force
consumers to purchase similar information elsewhere at a higher
price. The fact that a particular product poses dangers to health
or safety, generates high life-cycle costs, or is inadequate for
many tasks for which it might be used, does not necessarily re-
quire barring truthful information about what it can do. The
truthful information itself is valuable. Notwithstanding all its
risks and inadequacies, the product may be ideal for some con-
sumers; eliminating the truthful information would increase the
cost of finding the product, with no commensurate benefit. For
other consumers, the truthful information could induce more
rigorous comparative shopping for another adequate product that
has none of the costly disadvantages. 96 Accordingly, the Com-
mission should prohibit truthful information only as a last
resort-when no other means of avoiding misestimations is avail-
able.
Indeed, this principle seems to underlie the requirement in
Royal Milling and Jacob Siegel that before the FTC orders the
excision of a trade name it must consider less drastic alternatives
to remedy the deception.97 Trade names are valuable business
assets because they are an inexpensive and efficient source of
95. See, e.g., Lafayette United Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,499 (1974); Control Data Corp., [1970-1973
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,980 (1972).
96. For example, the mention by one waterbed seller of the weight
of his product in his advertising may alert consumers that weight is a
factor to consider in making a purchasing decision.
97. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
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product information.98 Any prohibition upon use of a trade
name will increase the cost to consumers of finding satisfactory
products. Excision is justifiable, therefore, only if there is no
less costly way to avoid the misestimations that the trade name
might induce.9
This principle also underlies many of the Commission's
recent rulemaking efforts. For example, when it became appar-
ent that cigarette smoking was hazardous to health, the Commis-
sion, rather than prohibiting advertising altogether, required
only that all advertising affirmatively disclose the hazard.10 0
Other current or proposed rules governing disclosure of octane
ratings of gasoline, 10 1 nutritional qualities of food, 0 2 durability
of light bulbs, 0 3 care and labeling of textile wearing apparel,04
funeral services, 0 5 used cars,10 6 and potential side effects of
over-the-counter antacids'0 7 similarly rely upon affirmative dis-
closures of limited usefulness, inadequacy, risk, or value.
4. Not Deterring Sellers from Providing Truthful Information
Truthful information can also be indirectly eliminated if the
high cost of product testing or disclosing additional information
deters sellers from making truthful claims that require such ex-
penditures. 0 8 The fourth principle, therefore, is that the allo-
98. See Cunningham, Perceived Risk and Brand Loyalty, in RIsK
TAnG AND INFORmA%7ON HANDLm G IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (D. Cox
ed. 1967).
99. To be sure, even when there is no less costly way to avoid mis-
estimations, elimination of truthful information is appropriate only if the
resulting cost of misestimations exceeds the value of the truthful infor-
mation.
100. Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, Rein-
stitution of Proceedings for Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rules, 34
Fed. Reg. 7917 (1969) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 408).
101. 16 C.F.R. § 422 (1977).
102. Food Advertising, Initiation of Proceedings for Promulgation of
Trade Regulation Rules, 39 Fed. Reg. 39,842 (1974) (to be codified in
16 C.F.R. § 437).
103. 16 C.F.R. § 409 (1977).
104. 16 C.F.R. § 423 (1977).
105. Funeral Industry Practice, Initiation of Proceedings for Promul-
gation of Trade Regulation Rules, 40 Fed. Reg. 39,901 (1975) (to be codi-
fied in 16 C.F.R. § 453).
106. Sales of Used Motor Vehicles, Proceedings for Proposed Trade
Regulation Rules, 41 Fed. Reg. 39, 337, 1089, 2100 (1976) (to be codified
in 16 C.F.R. § 455).
107. Advertising for Over-the-Counter Antacids, Initiation of Pro-
ceedings for Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rules, 41 Fed. Reg. 14,534(1976) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 415).
108. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246
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cation of responsibility to sellers to test their product claims or
to disclose additional information should not deter sellers from
making truthful claims, unless the truthful claims themselves
are more likely to induce consumer misestimations than to pro-
duce better purchasing decisions.
For example, if a seller's claim that his acupuncture service
"reduces pain" must be based upon rigorous scientific data, the
combined cost to the seller of commissioning tests and advertis-
ing may exceed total revenues generated by the message. If so,
the seller simply will not make this claim. This is inefficient
if the untested claim would have been valuable to consumers
who were in the market for a pain reliever and who would have
appropriately assessed the claim's reliability. In these circum-
stances, the cost of a less rigorous testing requirement, such as
testimonials from a random selection of recipients of the acupunc-
turist's services, would be more proportional to the degree of con-
sumer reliance on the claim; and revenues generated by the claim
would probably exceed its cost.
By the same token, if the acupuncturist were required to
disclose that the claim that acupuncture "reduces pain" is not
scientifically based, the direct cost of communicating the entire
message might exceed the revenues it generated; consequently,
the acupuncturist would cease making the initial claim. Con-
sumers would be harmed by this loss if the claim's value in aid-
ing their purchasing decisions would have exceeded its capacity
to induce them to overestimate the efficacy of acupuncture. The
disclosure requirement would be an unnecessary "product" for
which consumers would not willingly have bargained (had they
had the opportunity), and to which the resulting disparity be-
tween the acupuncturist's marginal costs and marginal revenues
would be largely attributable. On the other hand, consumers
would benefit if the opposite were true; that is, if the claim's
capacity to induce overestimation of the efficacy of acupuncture
exceeded its value as an aid to accurate purchasing decisions. In
this case, consumers willingly would have paid the acupuncturist
to stop making his claims (had such transactions been possible),
and the resulting disparity between the marginal cost of com-
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1112 (1973). A similar analysis would
be applicable to corrective advertising orders designed to cure lingering
deception caused by past advertising. Such orders should not be so
draconian that the mere possibility of their invocation deters advertisers
from making certain truthful claims-unless such claims themselves
were likely to induce misestimations to a greater extent than they
would induce better purchasing decisions.
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municating the message and the marginal revenues generated
would be largely attributable to the fall in consumer demand for
the services.
B. THE FREEDOM TO SELL AND PURCHASE COMIVIERCIAL INFORMA-
TION
The principles guiding efficient allocation of the costs of
protecting consumers also protect the first amendment rights of
those who engage in commercial speech. As Virginia Pharmacy
makes clear, first amendment protection of commercial speech
is linked to the notion that the free flow of commercial informa-
tion is "indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in the
free enterprise system."'109 Viewed in these terms, the "freedom"
of sellers to engage in commercial speech is in effect the freedom
to supply truthful diagnostic, testing, or search information with
the expectation that the revenues generated will exceed the cost
of supplying the information. And the "freedom" of consumers
to receive commercial speech is in effect the freedom to obtain
truthful commercial information at the least cost-up to that
point where the marginal cost of such information equals the
marginal savings in better purchasing decisions.
Any enhancement of consumer demand for truthful commer-
cial information therefore will induce a correspondingly greater
exercise of sellers' "right" to supply it. As we have seen, both
consumers' overestimations of the reliability of product informa-
tion and their underestimations of potential loss involved in the
purchase may result in an underinvestment in commercial infor-
mation relative to the savings such investment could generate.
Thus, in placing the direct cost of avoiding misestimations upon
sellers when they are in the best position to minimize that cost
(and deeming a seller's failure to bear such costs under these
circumstances to be "deceptive" or "unfair"), government inter-
vention in effect enables consumers to summon from sellers the
amount and quality of truthful commercial information con-
sumers need (and would have demanded had such transactions
been costless).
That sellers must bear the direct costs of substantiating or
disclosing additional information in these circumstances cannot
be construed as an infringement on their first amendment right
to engage in truthful commercial speech. So long as sellers' reve-
nues exceed the cost of supplying this information, the costs are
109. 425 U.S. at 765.
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simply passed on to consumers who willingly pay for the infor-
mation. If revenues generated by the information do not exceed
the cost of supplying it, it can fairly be assumed that con-
sumers are simply unwilling to purchase the product itself, given
its total costs. Sellers may, of course, continue to advertise the
product, but they have no first amendment right to profit from
sales to consumers who are not apprised of its risks or inadequa-
cies.
By the same token, as we have seen, a rational consumer
protection policy would use the least costly means of avoiding
consumer misestimations, and this principle equally serves to
protect sellers' first amendment rights. Since commercial infor-
mation is a product whose price is negotiated between seller and
consumer, the means of avoiding misestimations that is least ex-
pensive for consumers will necessarily be the least costly means
for sellers. And because any excision of truthful information
supplied by the seller is potentially costly for consumers, excision
will be a last resort, when neither substantiation nor additional
disclosures can remedy the misestimation. Thus, government
intervention to protect consumers will pose the least possible re-
striction upon seller's rights to supply truthful information.
Finally, a rational policy of consumer protection would seek
to avoid any "chilling effect" upon the supply of commercial
information brought about by an unnecessarily rigorous substan-
tiation or disclosure requirement. This, too, is entirely consistent
with the protection of sellers' first amendment rights because
it also helps to assure the free flow of truthful commercial
information.
In sum, so long as the overarching goal of government con-
sumer protection regulation is to maximize the flow of truthful
commercial information at the least cost, thereby enabling con-
sumers to make the best product choices relative to the cost of
information, the first amendment rights of commercial speakers
will also be protected. Both goals require that regulation be
carefully tailored to those instances where the market fails to
maximize this flow, and that remedies go no further than neces-
sary to enable consumers to avoid misestimations of reliability
or potential economic loss.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FTC FACTFINDING
AND CHOICE OF REMEDIES
The preceding discussion suggests that so long as the FTC's
consumer protection activities yield substantial benefits by
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maximizing the flow of truthful commercial information to
consumers, the first amendment rights of those who engage in
commercial speech are necessarily protected. If that is the case,
there is no reason for courts to narrow the Commission's discre-
tion to frame remedial relief or to scrutinize more carefully the
Commission's factfinding.
Courts traditionally have substituted their judgment for
that of administrative agencies in determining whether the
agencies have employed means that least restrict first amend-
ment interests. 110 Indeed, this principle underlies the federal
government's first amendment challenge to state regulations bar-
ring lawyer advertising. Moreover, courts on occasion have sub-
stituted their judgment on issues of fact where the agencies'
factfinding bears directly upon first amendment interests."'
Such substitutions of judicial judgment, however, are premised
on the presumption that the agency lacks both expertise in dis-
cerning the least restrictive alternative or in recognizing first
amendment interests, and neutrality in weighing first amendment
values against competing demands. 12  Reviewing courts are
thought to have the neutral perspective and expertise necessary
to make what are often difficult trade-offs between the first
amendment and competing government interests."13 According
to this view, it is appropriate for the courts to defer to agency
expertise in the agency's area of substantive responsibility, but
they should not defer to agencies when first amendment rights
are involved.
This premise may be correct with regard to state licensing
boards. These boards have no particular expertise in protecting
first amendment rights because their avowed mission is to foster
high professional standards, not to avail consumers of satisfac-
tory goods and services at least cost.1 4 There is no reason, there-
fore, to assume that state licensing boards will properly balance
110. See, e.g., NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1967);
Coppus Eng'r Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957).
111. See note 72 supra.
112. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
See generally Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960
SuP. CT. REv. 75.
113. See generally Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 578
n.2 (1968); Grove Press v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433, 435-36 (2d Cir.
1960); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE
L.J. 464 (1969).
114. See 425 U.S. at 751.
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the goal of maintaining high professional standards against the
principles of the first amendment.
But the premise may be totally incorrect with regard to the
FTC's consumer protection mission. Although the FTC has no
particular expertise in safeguarding first amendment rights, and
there is no reason to assume that it could appropriately weigh
first amendment rights against competing values, a primary
goal of the Commission's consumer protection efforts is to mini-
mize the cost to consumers of searching for the "right" product
and purchasing the "wrong" one. This goal is entirely con-
sistent with safeguarding the first amendment interests of those
who engage in commercial speech. Thus, unlike state licensing
boards, the FTC has acquired de facto expertise in protecting
the flow of truthful commercial speech by virtue of its statutory
responsibility to protect consumers, and accordingly there is no
need for a reviewing court's neutrality or constitutional expertise.
The Commission has been criticized in recent years for fail-
ing to select targets and remedies with cost efficiency in mind-
and thereby failing to adhere to the very principles that should
guide the efficient allocation of the costs of consumer protec-
tion.115 But in the context of judicial review this criticism is
beside the point. The issue is not whether the Commission could
fulfill its statutory responsibilities more effectively, but whether
the Commission has a greater capacity than reviewing courts to
do so. There can be little doubt that the Commission has greater
expertise than the courts in maximizing the flow of truthful com-
mercial information. Because its staff is experienced in assess-
ing supply and demand in the commercial information market, it
is better able than reviewing courts to discern methods of "fenc-
ing in" proven violators that least impede the free flow of truth-
ful information. Thus, the courts should defer to the Commis-
sion whenever it expressly finds that there are no less drastic
means of curing a deception.1" 6
115. See, e.g., a pointed series of critiques by Richard Posner: A Dis-
senting View: Do we Really Need an FTC?, ANTUST & ECON. REv.,
Spring 1970, at 65; RmuLAxioN OF ADvEnRsinG BY THm FTC 3-10, 17-29(1973); The Federal Trade Commission's Mandated Disclosure Program:
A Critique (unpublished address, Sept. 23, 1976, on file at MINNEOTA
LAw REvmw).
116. To support such a finding, it may be necessary during the ad-
ministrative hearing for the Commission staff to bear the burden of prov-
ing the absence of less drastic alternatives. The suggestion that the bur-
den is on the government to show lack of other available means was
made in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 378, 407 (1963). See also Talley
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Indeed, Beneficial itself reveals how unsuited reviewing
courts are to the delicate task of properly allocating the
costs of consumer protection. 117 The Commission had explicitly
considered whether a remedy less drastic than elimination of the
"instant tax refund" phrase in Beneficial's advertising would be
adequate to cure the deception. But because Beneficial was sim-
ply offering its everyday loan service, which was completely un-
related to the customer's eligibility for a tax refund, the Com-
mission determined that any use of the phrase was inherently
deceptive. The court of appeals rejected this conclusion and of-
fered the following examples of qualifying language that would
retain the "instant tax refund" phrase but would not, in the
court's view, convey the deceptive impression:
Beneficial's everyday loan service can provide to regularly
qualified borrowers an Instant Tax Refund Anticipation loan
whether or not the borrower uses our tax service.
or
Beneficial's everyday loan service can provide any regularly
qualified borrower an instant loan in anticipation of his tax re-
fund. We call it an Instant Tax Refund Anticipation Loan.118
But it is evident that these examples have the same defect as
Beneficial's initial advertisement. Use of the phrase "Instant
Tax Refund Anticipation Loan" still implies that the availability
of the loan has something to do with a possible tax refund, or
that eligibility for such a refund expedites or improves one's
chances for obtaining a loan. Either alternative could well in-
duce consumers who expected a tax refund to assume that their
prospects for obtaining a loan from Beneficial were enhanced,
or that Beneficial would offer a better deal than its competitors.
Consumers might therefore underinvest in commercial informa-
tion in pursuit of a possibly better borrowing opportunity.
The court in Beneficial was wrong, not because it required
that in identifying and curing deception the Commission take
cognizance of the first amendment and use means that inter-
fere least with the free flow of truthful information, but be-
cause it incorrectly assumed that the first amendment required
it to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. Had any
affirmative disclosure been sufficient to cure the deception, the
Commission presumably would have invoked it, thereby pre-
v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring); Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940).
117. For a discussion of Beneficial, see notes 62-72 supra and
accompanying text.
118. 542 F.2d at 619.
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serving for consumers the "instant tax refund" phrase as an eco-
nomical shorthand method of communication. The fact that the
Commission could discern no less drastic means of curing the
deception should have been dispositive of the first amendment
issue as well.
The apparent dilemma for the FTC of reconciling its broad
remedial discretion to protect consumers from false and deceptive
advertising with the dictates of the first amendment after Vir-
ginia Pharmacy is no dilemma at all so long as reviewing courts
understand the purpose and nature of the Commission's con-
sumer protection mission. Because commercial information is a
commodity in trade, the first amendment interests of those who
supply it are coterminous with the consumer interests of those
who demand it. In protecting the latter, the Commission guards
the former. Thus, while the first amendment protects the free
flow of commercial information as well as of ideas and opinions,
in the free marketplace of commerce the FTC should have pri-
mary jurisdiction.
1977]

